Analyzing accidents is a vital exercise in the development of safety-critical software systems to prevent past accidents from reoccurring in the future. Current practices such as causal event analysis are insufficient in light of a growing trend of accidents involving complex interactions between components with and without the occurrence of failures. Furthermore, the reuse of accident knowledge in current practices relies heavily on human expert recall and interpretation. In this paper, we propose an ontological classification mechanism to acquire and reuse knowledge from past accidents that focuses on the interactions taking place in a system. A set of knowledge bases are constructed independently using a feature-based classification and a domain specific ontology to organize the term spaces of each feature. Similarity mechanisms are introduced to retrieve and integrate the acquired knowledge into the new system analyses. Our experiments show how our approach reuses accident knowledge to uncover potential safety concerns in future safety analysis that may otherwise have been incorrectly classified in traditional approaches.
Introduction
Modeling and learning from past accidents is a critical exercise in the analysis of safety-critical systems. Typically, accident models uncover the collection of events that resulted in human and physical losses within a particular environment. The aims of such an exercise are to understand the safety concerns 1 that contributed towards accidents and to then prevent these accidents from reoccurring in future systems.
Various views exist on how to model accidents. These include energy based models, chain of events models and models based on human and organizational attributes [10] . The common focus in these techniques is on causal event analysis where events are limited to failures of components. Such practices are insufficient in light of a growing trend of accidents being attributed to complex interactions between components with and without the occurrence of failures [11] .
Furthermore, the learning from accidents and the consequent reuse of the acquired accident knowledge in current practices widely remain subject to the interpretation and recall by human experts. Few mechanisms exist to learn accidents from a collection of accident data such that the acquired knowledge may be directly integrated into the system and safety analysis of future systems, with little or no manual interpretation.
The need for such techniques becomes even more apparent with the influx of everyday software-intensive applications that happen to be safety-critical. Examples include by-wire systems, personal medical equipments and home security and safety systems. Such applications demand rapid development and thrive on their ability to evolve quickly with changes in consumer demands and technology. A repository of accident knowledge together with an effective retrieval mechanism provides software and safety analysts with a tool to rapidly uncover safety concerns within the system designs whenever a change occurs.
Notable exceptions that address learning and reuse of accidents include Johnson [7] that proposes an approach to build incident reuse libraries and provides a user query-based questioning approach. This allows analysts to test their hypothesis regarding safety concerns of future systems by asking the right sets of questions. However, the problem of integrating the findings in future system and safety analysis remains unresolved. This problem is somewhat addressed in Basnyat et al. [1] through the use of Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [8] but is restricted to analysis of single accidents and does not support learning across a large set of accidents in a system domain.
In this paper, we present an approach for modeling and learning from past accidents for a given system domain. The aim is to integrate the knowledge about past accidents involving similar systems directly into the safety analysis of a system under development. In this context, our approach consists of three parts: (1) a modeling scheme to represent knowledge about accidents, (2) a classification mechanism to then encode knowledge from past accidents and similar systems into a repository and (3) a set of similarity metrics to retrieve knowledge about accidents to be included in the safety analysis of a system under investigation. The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the concept of system interactions and its importance in conducting safety and system analysis. Section 3 presents our accident modeling scheme. Section 4 describes our classification and retrieval scheme. Section 5 presents an experimental analysis of our approach. A discussion of related work is presented in section 6. We conclude in section 7 with a summary of the findings and outline future work.
Analyzing System Interactions
At the center of our approach lies the concept of system interactions. A system interaction between two or more components, including human tasks, is defined as a collective coexistence of components' internal states and behaviors influencing each other during the operation of a system [11] . In principle, interactions take into account the collective effect of its constituting elements such that the information gained is more than the sum of the parts. A detail study of system interactions in software and safety analysis appears in [11] .
For purposes of illustration, consider a vehicle system installed with an Electromechanical Braking (EMB) system. An EMB system is a software controlled system for vehicles that replaces hydraulics control systems with electronic ones [6] . Figure 2 outlines the components of an EMB system over a vehicle layout diagram. We use this system as a running example to illustrate our approach in this paper.
One example of a system interaction between a driver and a vehicle brake pedal is said to take place whereby a driver presses on the brake pedal in an attempt to slow down the vehicle while steering the vehicle along a bend. Another example system interaction could take place within the e-caliper involving the power control, the actuator position sensor and the software controller components whereby the software controller influences the power control to switch on while the position sensor reports the actuator position to be ready for braking. 
Interactions
2 form an integral concept in the analysis of safety as more accidents are now being attributed to interactions between components with and without the presence of failures. This observation is primarily attributed to the increasing use of independent components and the resulting increase in the unpredictability of the behaviors that emerge when components are put together in a complex environment [5] . Studying interactions are particularly important when human tasks, that may not produce adverse effects on their own, interact with other system components in a given environment to result in an accident [9] .
Our use of interactions in accident modeling thus is in contrast to current techniques of events and failure analysis where component failures are assigned responsibility for an accident. In contrast, interactions not only subsumes the concepts of failures, they also effectively describe the collocation of components and their collective contribution to an accident.
Interaction-based Accident Modeling
We informally define our accident modeling scheme to contain the following essential information when describing an accident: (1) system interactions, (2) environment states and (3) the resulting accident outcomes observed during an accident.
With this shift in focus from causal event analysis and component failures to a wider scope of interactions, we now present a scheme to effectively model accidents using interactions. The accident modeling scheme is then used to classify and retrieve accident data for analysis of similar systems under investigation. The modeling scheme should therefore facilitate the acquisition of accident data from disparate sources such as accident reports and system models while allowing for effective reuse of the encoded accident knowledge.
We base our accident modeling scheme on the premise that effective reuse of the acquired knowledge is dependent upon, among other factors, loose couplings between the system interactions, environment states, and accident outcomes that makeup an accident [3] . Loose coupling between these three segments of information encourages independent learning and transferability of knowledge, especially when more accidents are discovered and encoded into the repository. Our accident modeling scheme therefore, emphasizes the separation between system interactions, the environment states and the resulting accident outcomes within a system domain. This separation also allows us to uncover cases where multiple interactions contribute to a single accident as well as cases where one interaction contributes to multiple accidents. Further, the separation also facilitate the classification of incidents in the absence of any accident outcome.
We describe accident outcomes as the human or physical losses that result from an accident. We hypothesize that there are limited and manageable sets of accident outcomes that can occur for a given system domain. In [11] , we showed that over 65% of accidents outcomes recorded for a software controlled industrial press could be accounted for by only three categories of accident outcomes. In principle, building a knowledge base of accidents outcomes should provide valuable insight into preventing these outcomes in similar systems under development.
Similarly, environment states represent the conditions where the system interactions took place during an accident. Modeling environment states is necessary as they play a significant part in understanding how accidents occur. Environment states also represent the conditions that are least likely to change from one similar system to another thus enabling effective reuse during future safety analysis. Figure 3 is a conceptual representation of our proposed accident modeling scheme. The arrows show the mapping rules between interactions and environment states and how they results in an accident outcome. Formally, for a given domain of systems, we define our Interaction-based Accident Model (IAM) and its constituting accidents as follows.
Definition 1 (IAM Accident) Given a set of system interactions SI, a set of environment states ES and a set of accident outcomes AO, IAM is defined as a 3-tuple {SI, ES, AO}, where an individual accident, represented as a mapping rule r from the set of all accident mapping rules R, is a path
where SI ⊆ SI, ES ⊆ ES and AO ⊆ AO.
Take for example an accident where a caliper incorrectly interacted with an actuator, while an over speeding vehicle traveling in low light steered off a curved path and into a tree resulting in damage to the vehicle and injuries to the driver. Let us denote the interactions between the caliper and the actuator, and between an over speeding driver and the brake pedal by si 1 and si 2 respectively. Further, the environment states are denoted by es 1 for "curved path" and es 2 for "low light". Then, this accident resulting in a "frontal collision" ao 1 and injuries to the driver ao 2 is represented in IAM using the mapping rule r i : {si 1 , si 2 } → {es 1 , es 2 } → {ao 1 , ao 2 }.
Interaction-based Classification
Using IAM, we can now build a repository of knowledge about accidents within a domain. In this paper, we use the concepts of feature-oriented classification [2] to separately classify interactions, environment states and accident outcomes. A feature-oriented classification is a variant of the faceted classification [13] where objects are classified using an extensible list of features allowing multiple terms to be selected from each feature. This allows us to accommodate varying levels of details in accident reports and system models that are used to construct the classification.
We extend the feature-oriented classification for purposes of conducting interaction-based safety analysis and propose to organize the term spaces for each feature using a separate ontology. Each ontology is constructed as set of acyclic graphs based on three semantic relations. Meronymy, an "is part of" relation, represented as A− B to denote A as a part of B. Hyponymy, an "is kind of" relation, represented as A− B to denote A as a kind of B. Lastly, a synonymy relation defined as "is same as" and reprsented as A B to denote A being similar to B [15] . The first two represent the most commonly used relations when developing system design models while Synonymy is beneficial in cases where accident reports are not governed by a controlled vocabulary. Evidently, the Synonymy relation needs to be interpreted within the context of the domain for each ontology.
Interaction Classification
As previously discussed in section 2, an interaction encapsulates the structure and behavior of its participating components. Therefore, the components along with their internal states and events form the feature set used to describe interactions. Events are behavioral queues that a component sends or receives allowing it to transition between one internal state to another during the operation of the system. Events and internal states only exist within a context of a component, and a component itself is defined as follows: where EV ⊆ EV , ST ⊆ ST , cn ∈ CN and co ∈ CO, the set of all components. Continuing with the EMB system example, the component power control (see Figure 2) 
Next, an interaction is represented as a tuple of some combination of terms from one or more features.
Definition 3 (Interaction) Given a set of n components {co 1 , · · · , co n }, each having a set of events EV 1 ∈ co 1 , · · · , EV n ∈ co n respectively, a system interaction si is represented as tuple
and si ∈ SI, is the set of all system interactions.
The interaction tuple is ordered in temporal terms by giving precedence to component states and events that take place earlier. An example interaction within the e-caliper is then represented as {{Actuator P osition Sensor, activate}, {P ower Control, turn on}} where the position sensor activates to result in the power control unit to turn on.
The term spaces for the features component name, internal state and event are each organized based on a separate ontology. The component name ontology serves three purposes. Synonymy relations construct similarity based on the names alone within the domain context using a thesaurus and experts. Meronymy relations construct structural hierarchy of components based on a system design model such as a UML Statechart. Lastly, the hyponymy relations establish links between specialized forms of a particular component viewed as a black box. Figure 4 illustrates a partial component name ontology of the EMB system outlining the structural hierarchies along with the synonym and "kind-of" relationships of the motor component. Ontology construction for internal state and event features' term spaces involves similar processes but are limited to the synonymy and hyponymy relations. Events and internal states are classified independent of their enclosing component and the interaction descriptors are used to aggregate them based on the context of the components involved in the interaction. For example, failure states could be classified independent of a particular component by importing existing classifications such as a failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) scheme [12] directly into our internal state ontology. Figures 5(a) and 5(b) illustrate an example ontological designs for the internal state "failed" and a "turn on" event respectively. Component tuples are defined in terms of these separate knowledge bases of component names, internal states and events that in turn define the interaction tuples. Each interaction tuple is then inserted into the IAM repository from either existing system models or from accident reports. This repository of interactions are then searched during the retrieval stage when conducting safety analysis of a new similar system under development.
Environment State and Accident Outcome Classifications
Since environment states are domain specific, the feature sets used to classify them will change from one domain to another. In this paper, we make use of an existing ontology to organize environment states. Table 1 outlines a partial feature set and example terms used by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) to classify environment states in their vehicle accident reports. We formalize the description of environment states for purposes of retrieval in our approach whereby an environment state es ∈ ES, the environment states set in the repository, is defined as a tuple es = {we, rc, li, sp}, where we, rc, li, and sp denote the weather condition, road configuration, light condition and zone speed limit respectively.
Weather
Config For the accident outcome classification we adopt the feature sets from medical classifications such as [14] to preserve consistency with the vast amount of accident reports that follow these conventions. Organizing accident outcomes involves classifying physical damage as well as human losses. Table 2 outlines a partial feature set and example terms for each feature. An accident outcome descriptor ao ∈ AO, the total accident outcome set in the repository, is defined as a tuple ao = {pd, sv, im, re}, where pd, sv, im, and re denote the physical damage, injury severity, impact and body region respectively. Together with environment state information, system and safety experts can use this knowledge about accident outcomes to conduct scenario analysis on systems under investigation. Having established the knowledge bases of system interactions, environment states and accident outcomes, individual accidents are stored by establishing the accident mapping rules as outlined in Definition 1.
Retrieval of Safety Concerns
Given a target system model, system interactions are extracted using techniques such as [11] where Statecharts are used to extract event and state synchronizations. Analysts can identify whether these target interactions or any interactions similar to these have been responsible for accidents in the past. Analysts can also determine the frequency with which these interactions were cited in the accident knowledge base as well as the environment states and the accident outcomes observed. Analysts can then revisit their target model to remove these undesired interactions or apply further constraints to ensure safe operations in an iterative manner.
The coverage of safety analysis inevitably depends upon the number of accidents observed in the past. However, ensuring past accidents are not repeated is highly valuable on its own, especially when comparing the safety concerns posed by various iterations of a design model.
The retrieval of interactions draws upon a set of distance measures used to describe the similarity between two interactions. Given an interaction query, the constituting elements of the interaction descriptor are searched in their respective repositories. The overall n-Match retrieval process is summarized below.
1. Collect all target interactions extracted from the system model under investigation.
2. For each target interaction si, compute similarity between si and each si in the IAM interaction repository.
3. Return n interactions having n smallest similarity values and their accident mapping rules.
Interaction Similarity
Recall that a system interaction si is described in terms of the participating components and their respective behaviors represented by events. For a set of system interactions SI, we define a metric space (SI, D I ) where D I is a function on SI such that
For interactions si, si ∈ SI, D I (si, si ) is a distance function used to indicate the similarity between si and the target si . D I is defined as an aggregate function over the distance functions of components and events involved in an interaction. Since interaction tuples are ordered, the component and event distance functions are applied to adjacent entries in the interactions being compared. For si = {{co 1 , EV 1 }, · · · , {co n , EV n }} and 
Component Similarity
The component distance function D c is defined as
where w s , w e and w n are the weights assigned on distances between component internal states D s , component events D e and component names D n respectively. The choice of weights are left at the discretion of the safety analyst to rank the importance of each measure when retrieving interactions. D s , the distance function computing the collective similarity between internal states sets ST = {s 1 , · · · , s n } and ST = {s 1 , · · · , s m } of two components co and co , having m > n is computed using Algorithm 1.
From 
where x is the length of the shortest path between s i and s j in the internal state ontology (see Figure 5 (a)) and y = 1 + length of longest path in the internal state ontology. The distance functions D e for event and D n for component names are defined similarly.
Experimental Results
We now investigate the safety concerns posed by the EMB system under development (Figure 2 ) by reusing past vehicle accidents. We analyzed a total of 500 vehicle accidents from ATSB to construct our ontological knowledge bases of system interactions, environment states and resulting accident outcomes. Continuing with the two system interactions extracted from the EMB system model in section 4.1, we retrieve similar interactions from the accident knowledge bases that were responsible for past accidents, along with the details about other participating interactions, environment states and accident outcomes.
The closest repository matches for the EMB system interactions si 1 = {{Power Control, fail}, {Actuator Position Sensor, delayed transmission}} and si 2 = {{Driver, press pedal},{Pedal sensor, activate}} were si 1 = {{Hydraulic pump, fail}, {Brake, delayed response}} and si 2 = {{Driver, press pedal}} respectively. Table 3 shows the two most frequent accident mapping rules collectively associated with these matched interactions in the IAM repository. The results highlight the need to consider the impact of each interaction in conjunction with the surrounding environment. Safety analysts could then mitigate these concerns by applying constraints on these interactions or by enforcing safety guards to activate upon detection of these environment conditions or system interactions.
Environment State Accident Outcome (fine,single,day,curve) (front damage,severe injury) (fine,day,head on) (front damage,severe injury) Table 3 . Retrieved mapping rules.
Compared to our approach, a traditional root cause analysis applied to the same data set yielded results that lay the blame on the driver without due consideration to the role of interactions and environment states leading to accidents. Figure 6 illustrates the results where root causes fall between event codes 400 and 600, which represent driver errors such as "excessive speeding" and "error at control". Considering root causes therefore provides limited information to the safety analysts as how to prevent such cases from reoccurring. 
Related Work
Several accident and incident reporting databases such as the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) provide insertion and retrieval of past incidents and accidents details. These schemes are largely based on free-text and provide responses based on continuous refinements of user queries. Johnson [7] uses ASRS to conduct incident analysis. Incidents are classified based on their causal factors and failure points and then mapped onto potential user questions. Johnson [7] tends to amalgamate system events (including environmental and human tasks) and the resulting accidents/incidents. As a result, there is a build up of redundant system events and accident outcomes in the libraries making it difficult to manage the classification growth and encumbering useful statistical analysis. Furthermore, the knowledge base results in strong coupling between system events and their accidents. In our work, we overcome this issue by separating the construction and maintenance of system events and accident classifications.
Feng and Lutz [4] apply the concepts of product-line engineering to conduct safety analysis across a group of products with a set of common overall goals. Common and variable features are identified across all the products followed by a hazard identification process that identifies hazards using FTA and FMEA. Such an approach runs the risk of overlooking system interactions within the system which may result in accidents where the interacting components themselves function properly. In our work, we use system interactions as first class entities and consider interactions, functioning and failed, that have resulted in accidents in past systems. Another important distinction between our work and [4] is that our emphasis is not on the reuse of components but instead on the reuse of the safety analysis itself. That is, we are primarily concerned with avoiding repetition of past accidents by highlighting potential safety concerns in similar future systems.
Conclusion and Future Work
Learning and Reusing knowledge from past accidents is essential to resolve safety concerns in future systems under development before they materialize into accidents. In this paper, we have proposed an approach for modeling accidents with an emphasis on system interactions and environmental influences. We have also introduced a mechanism for classifying interactions and accidents to construct ontological knowledge bases. The reuse of this knowledge in future safety analysis of similar systems is achieved through a set of similarity metrics.
The results have shown that our approach effectively facilitates the reuse of past accident knowledge to uncover potential safety concerns. We further showed how our interaction-based classifications potentially avoids the insufficiency of traditional causal event analysis. Our approach also scales across various sources of data such as system models and accident reports with varying degrees of detail by allowing non-symmetric lengths of queries for our similarity metrics.
In future research, we plan to investigate the automation of interaction extraction from textual accident reports as well as building accident collection frameworks and tools that could be used to collect interaction-based accident data.
